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Fisher v. University of Texas at Alistin
11-345
Ruling Below: Fisher v. University of Texas at A1fstin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012).
Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz, both Texas residents, were denied undergraduate
admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the class entering in Fall 2008. They filed this
suit alleging that UT's admissions policies discriminated against them on the basis of race in
violation of their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil
rights statutes. They sought damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Proceeding with
separate phases of liability and remedy, the district court found no liability and granted summary
judgment to the University. Applicants appealed.
Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, permit the University of
Texas at Austin's use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions.

Abigail Noel FISHER; Rachel Multer Michalewicz, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN; David B. Pryor, Executive Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs in His Official Capacity; William Powers, Jr., President of the University
of Texas at Austin in His Official Capacity; Board of Regents of the University of Texas
System; R. Steven Hicks, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity;
William Eugene Powell, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity;
James R. Huffines, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; Janiece
Longoria, as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; Colleen McHugh,
as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; Robert L. Stillwell, as
Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; James D. Dannenbaum, as
Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; Paul Foster, as Member of the
Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; Printice L. Gary, as Member of the Board of
Regents in His Official Capacity; Kedra Ishop, Vice Provost and Director of
Undergraduate Admissions in Her Official Capacity; Francisco G. Cigarroa, M.D., Interim
Chancellor of the University of Texas System in His Official Capacity, DefendantsAppellees.
United States Comt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided January 18,2011
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge
We consider a challenge to the use of race in

undergraduate admissions at the University
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of Texas at Austin. While the University has
confined its explicit use of race to the
elements of a program approved by the
Supreme Court in Grzttter v. Bollinger, UT's
program acts upon a university applicant
pool shaped by a legislatively-mandated
parallel diversity initiative that guarantees
admission to Texas students in the top ten
percent of their high school class. The everincreasing number of minorities gaining
admission under this Top Ten Percent Law
casts a shadow on the horizon to the
otherwise-plain legality of the Grzttter-like
admissions program, the Law's own legal
footing aside. While the Law's ultimate fate
is not the fare of this suit, the challenge to
the Grzttfer plan here rests upon the intimate
ties and ultimate confluence of the two
mItIatIves.
Today
we
affirm
the
constitutionality of the University's program
as it existed when Appellants applied and
were denied admission.

Justice Powell, who wrote separately in
Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke. This vision of diversity encompassed
a broad array of qualifications and
characteristics where race was a single but
impoliant element. The Michigan Law
School designed its admissions program to
achieve this broad diversity, selecting
students with varied backgrounds and
experiences-including
varied
racial
backgrounds-who would respect and learn
from one another. The Court explained:

Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz,
both Texas residents, were denied
undergraduate admission to the University
of Texas at Austin for the class entering in
Fall 2008. They filed this suit alleging that
UT's admissions policies discriminated
against them on the basis of race in violation
of their right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil
rights statutes. They sought damages as well
as Injunctive and declaratory relief.
Proceeding with separate phases of liability
and remedy, the district court, in a
thoughtful opinion, found no liability and
granted summary judgment to
the
University.

The Law School's policy also reaffirmed its
"longstanding commitment" to
"one
particular type of diversity, that is, racial and
ethnic diversity with special reference to the
inclusion of students from groups which
have been historically discriminated against,
like African-Americans, Hispanics and
Native Americans, who without this
commitment might not be represented in
[the] student body in meaningful numbers."

I. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER

A.
Grzttter embraced the diversity interest
atiiculated twenty-five years earlier by

[The Law School's] policy makes clear there
are many possible bases for diversity
admissions, and provides examples of
admittees who have lived or traveled widely
abroad, are fluent in several languages, have
overcome personal adversity and family
hardship, have exceptional records of
extensive community service, and have had
successful careers in other fields.

In an effort to ensure representation of
minorities, the Law School sought to enroll
a "critical mass" of minority students, which
would result in increased minority
engagement in the classroom and enhanced
minority contributions to the character of the
School. The Grutter Court endorsed this
goal, holding that diversity, including
seeking a critical mass of minority students,
is "a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university
admissions."
3

B.

Recognizing the pursuit of diversity,
including racial diversity, to be a compelling
interest in higher education, Grutter
endorsed the right of public universities to
increase enrollment of underrepresented
minorities. Grutter also cautioned that,
while it accepted diversity as a compelling
interest, any sorting of persons on the basis
of race must be by measures narrowly
tailored to the interest at stake.
As we read the Court, a university
admissions program is nalTowly tailored
only if it allows for individualized
consideration of applicants of all races. Such
consideration does not define an applicant
by race but instead ensures that she is valued
for all her unique attributes. Rather than
applying fixed stereotypes of ways that race
affects students' lives, an admissions policy
must be "'flexible enough to consider all
peliinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant. '"
As the Supreme Court later summarized,
"The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter
was that the admissions program at issue
there focused on each applicant as an
individual, and not simply as a member of a
particular racial group." Thus, a university
admissions policy is more likely to be
narrowly tailored if it contemplates that a
broad range of qualities and experiences
beyond race will be impOliant contributions
to diversity and as such are appropriately
considered in admissions decisions.
Both Bakke and Gratz finnly rejected group
treatment, insisting that the focus be upon
individuals and that an
applicant's
achievements be judged in the context of
one's personal circumstances, of which race
is only a part. So deployed, a white applicant
raised by a single parent who did not attend

high school and struggled paycheck to
paycheck and a minority child of a
successful cardiovascular surgeon may both
claim adversity, but the personal hurdles
each has cleared will not be seen to be of the
same height.

C.
Finally, Grutter reqmres that any raceconscious measures must have a "logical
end point" and be "limited in time." This
durational requirement can be satisfied by
sunset provisions or by periodic reviews to
reconsider whether there are feasible raceneutral alternatives that would achieve
diversity interests "'about as well. ,,, In this
respect, Grutter is best seen not as an
unqualified
endorsement
of
racial
preferences, but as a transient response to
anemic academic diversity. As Justice
O'Connor observed, "We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today."

II. THE CHALLENGED POLICY

A.
UT is a public institution of higher
education, authorized by the Texas
Constitution and supported by state and
federal funding. Accordingly, it begins its
admissions process by dividing applicants
into three pools: (1) Texas residents, (2)
domestic non-Texas residents, and (3)
international students. Students compete for
admission only against other students in
their respective pool. Texas residents are
allotted 90% of all available seats, with
admission based on a two-tiered system,
beginning with students automatically
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law
and then filling the remaining seats on the
basis of the Academic and Personal
4

Achievement Indices. Because Appellants
are Texas residents, their challenge focuses
on the admissions procedures applied to instate applicants.
Texas applicants are divided into two
subgroups: (l) Texas residents who are in
the top ten percent of their high school class
and (2) those Texas residents who are not.
Top ten percent applicants are guaranteed
admission to the University, and the vast
majority of freshmen are selected in this
way, without a confessed consideration of
race.
The remaining Texas applicants, who were
not within the top ten percent of their high
school graduating class, compete for
admission based on their Academic and
Personal
Achievement
Indices.
The
Academic Index is the mechanical formula
OPA using
that predicts freshman
standardized test scores and high school
class rank. Some applicants' AI scores are
high enough that they receive admission
based on that score alone. Others are low
enough that their applications are considered
presumptively denied.
The Personal Achievement Index is based
on three scores: one score for each of the
two required essays and a third score, called
the personal achievement score, which
represents an evaluation of the applicant's
entire file. The essays are each given a score
between 1 and 6 through "a holistic
evaluation of the essay as a piece of writing
based on its complexity of thought,
substantiality of development, and facility
with language."
None of the elements of the personal
achievement score-including race-are
considered individually or given separate
numerical values to be added together.
Rather, the file is evaluated as a whole in

order to provide the fullest possible
understanding of the student as a person and
to place his or her achievements in context.
Race is considered as part of the applicant's
context whether or not the applicant belongs
to a minority group, and so-at least in
theory-it "can positively impact applicants
of all races, including Caucasian[s], or [it]
may have no impact whatsoever."
Moreover, given the mechanics of UT's
admissions process, race has the potential to
influence only a small part of the applicant's
overall admissions score. The sole instance
when race is considered is as one element of
the personal achievement score, which itself
is only a part of the total PAL
B.

Although the process for calculating AI and
P AI scores is common to all parts of the
University, each offer of admission to UT is
ultimately tied to an individual school or
major. Texas residents in the top ten percent
of their high school class are guaranteed
admission to the University, but they are not
assured admission to the individual school
or program of their choice.
Top Ten Percent Law applicants who do not
receive automatic entry to their first choice
program compete for admission to the
remaining spaces, and if necessary to their
second-choice program, on the basis of their
AI and PAl scores. The admissions office
places students into matrices for each
preferred school or major, with students
grouped by AI score along one axis and PAl
score along the other axis. Liaisons for the
majors then establish a cutoff line, which is
drawn in a stair-step pattern. Applicants
denied admission to their first-choice
program are considered for their second
choice, with cutoff lines readjusted to reflect
the influx of those applicants. Any top ten
percent applicants not admitted to either
5

their first- or second-choice program are
automatically admitted as Liberal Arts
Undeclared majors. All other applicants not
yet admitted to UT compete, again
according to AI and PAl scores, for any
remaInIng seats in the Liberal Arts
Undeclared program.

c.
The Academic Index and Personal
Achievement Index now employed by UT
have been in continuous use since 1997. The
lone substantive change came in 2005,
following the Grutter decision, when the
of
Regents
authorized
the
Board
consideration of race as another "special
circumstance" in assessing an applicant's
personal achievement score.
Race-like all other elements of UT's
holistic review-is not considered alone.
reVieWIng
each
Admissions
officers
application are aware of the applicant's race,
but UT does not monitor the aggregate racial
composition of the admitted applicant pool
during the process. The admissions decision
for any particular applicant is not affectedpositively or negatively-by the number of
other students in her racial group who have
been admitted during that year.
D.
The district court found that both the UT and
Grutter policies "attempt to promote 'crossracial understanding, ' 'break down racial
stereotypes,' enable students to better
understand persons of other races, better
prepare students to function in a multicultural workforce, cultivate the next set of
national leaders, and prevent minority
students from serving as 'spokespersons' for
their race." Like the law school in Grutter,
UT "has determined, based on its experience
and expertise, that a 'critical mass' of

underrepresented minorities is necessary to
further its compelling interest in securing the
educational benefits of a diverse student
body."
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Judicial deference to a university'S academic
decisions rests on two independent
foundations. First, these decisions are a
product of "complex educational jUdgments
in an area that lies primarily within the
expertise of the university," far outside the
of the
courts.
Second,
experience
"universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition," with educational
autonomy
grounded
in
the
First
Amendment. As Justice Powell explained in
Bakke, "[a]cademic freedom ... includes [a
university's] selection of its student body."
Yet the scrutiny triggered by racial
classification "is no less strict for taking into
account" the special circumstances of higher
education. "[S]trict scrutiny is designed to
provide a framework for carefully
examining the impOliance and the sincerity
of the reasons
advanced
by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of
race in [a] particular context." Narrow
tailoring, a component of strict scrutiny,
requires any use of racial classifications to
so closely fit a compelling goal as to remove
the possibility that the motive for the
classification
was
illegitimate
racial
stereotype. Rather than second-guess the
merits of the University'S decision, a task
we are ill-equipped to perform, we instead
scrutinize the University'S decisionmaking
process to ensure that its decision to adopt a
race-conscious admissions policy followed
from the good faith consideration Grutter
requires. We presume the University acted
in good faith, a presumption Appellants are
6

free to rebut. Relatedly, while we focus on
the University's decision to adopt a GYlItterlike plan, admissions outcomes remain
relevant evidence of the plan's necessity-a
reality check.

school districts' programs because they
pursued racial balancing and defined
students
based
on
racial
group
classifications,
not
on
individual
circumstances.

B.

In short, the Court has not retreated from
Gnttter's mode of analysis, one tailored to
holistic university admissions programs.
Thus, we apply strict scrutiny to raceconSCIOUS admissions policies in higher
education, mindful of a university'S
academic freedom and the complex
educational
judgments
made
when
assembling a broadly diverse student body.

With a nod to GYlItfer's command that we
generally give a degree of deference to a
university's
educational
judgments,
Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend
such deference to a university's decision to
implement a race-conscious admissions
policy. Instead, they maintain Gruffer
deferred only to the university's judgment
that diversity would have educational
benefits, not to the assessment of whether
the university has attained critical mass of a
racial group or whether race-conscious
effOlis are necessary to achieve that end.
As an initial matter, this argument in its full
flower is contradicted by GYlItter. The
majority held that, like the examination into
whether the University has a compelling
interest, "the narrow-tailoring inquiry . . .
must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues
raised by the use of race to achieve student
body diversity in public higher education."
That is, the narrow-tailoring inquiry-like
the
compelling-interest
inquiry-is
undertaken with a degree of deference to the
University's
constitutionally protected,
presumably expert academic judgment.
Parents Involved in Comm1fnity Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 further
supports this understanding. The Parents
Involved COUli never suggested that the
school districts would be required to prove
their plans were meticulously supported by
some patiicular quantum of specific
evidence. Rather, the COUli struck down the

c.
Appellants do not allege that UI's raceconscious admissions policy is functionally
different from, or gives greater consideration
to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter.
Rather, Appellants question whether UT
needs a GYlItter-like policy. As their
argument goes, the University'S raceIS
conscious
admissions
program
unwarranted because (1) UT has gone
beyond a mere interest in diversity for
education's sake and instead pursues a racial
composition that mirrors that of the state of
Texas as a whole, amounting to an
unconstitutional attempt to achieve "racial
balancing"; (2) the University has not given
adequate consideration to available "raceneutral" alternatives, particularly percentage
plans like the Top Ten Percent Law; and (3)
UI's minority enrollment under the Top Ten
Percent Law already surpassed critical mass,
such that the additional (and allegedly
"minimal") increase in diversity achieved
through UI's GYlItter-like policy does not
justify its use of race-conscious measures.
We will consider each of these arguments in
turn.
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IV. RACIAL BALANCING

1.

A.

The district court expressly found that race
can enhance the personal achievement score
of a student from any racial background,
including whites and Asian-Americans.
This possibility is the point of Grutter's
holistic and individualized assessments,
which must be "'flexible enough to consider
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of
the particular qualifications of each
applicant. '" Indeed, just as in Gruffer, UT
applicants of every race may submit
supplemental information to highlight their
potential diversity contributions, which
allows students who are diverse in
unconventional ways to describe their
unique attributes.

UT's system was modeled after the Grutter
program, which the Supreme Court held was
not a quota. UT has never established a
specific number, percentage, or range of
minority enrollment that would constitute
"critical mass," nor does it award any fixed
number of points to minority students in a
way that impermissibly values race for its
own sake.
Further, there is no indication that UT's
Grutter-like plan is a quota by another
name. It is hue that UT looks in part to the
number of minority students when
evaluating whether it has yet achieved a
critical mass, but "[s]ome attention to
numbers, without more, does not transform a
flexible admissions system into a rigid
quota." Whereas a quota imposes a fixed
percentage standard that cannot be deviated
from,
a permissible
diversity goal
"'require[s] only a good-faith effort ... to
come within a range demarcated by the goal
itself. '" Indeed, UT's policy improves upon
the program approved in Grutter because the
University does not keep an ongoing tally of
the racial composition of the entering class
during its admissions process.

B.
Appellants nevertheless argue that UT's
program amounts to racial balancing
because it supposedly evinces a special
concern
or
demographically
underrepresented groups, while neglecting
the diverse contributions of others. These
arguments do not account for the operation
of UT's admissions system or the scope of
the diversity interest approved by the Court
in Grutter.

The summary judgment record shows that
demographics are not consulted as part of
any individual admissions decision, and
UT's admissions procedures do not treat
certain racial
groups or minontIes
differently than others when reviewing
individual applications. Rather, the act of
considering minority group demographics
(to which Appellants object) took place only
when the University first studied whether a
race-conscious admissions program was
needed to attain critical mass. Appellants'
objection therefore must be directed not to
the design of the program, but rather to
whether UT's decision to reintroduce race as
a factor in admissions was made in good
faith.

2.
Appellants contend that UT revealed its true
motive to be outright racial balancing when
it referenced state population data to justify
the adoption of race-conscious admissions
measures. They insist that if UT were truly
focused on educational benefits and critical
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mass, then there should be no reason to
consult demographic data when determining
whether UT had sufficient minority
representation.
We disagree. The University's policies and
measured attention to the community it
serves are consonant with the educational
goals outlined in Grutter and do not suppOli
a finding that the University was engaged in
improper racial balancing during our time
frame of review. Both Grutter and Bakke
recognized that "there is of course 'some
relationship between numbers and achieving
the benefits to be derived from a diverse
student body. '" In its policymaking process,
UT gave appropriate attention to those
educational benefits identified in Grutter
without overstepping any constitutional
bounds.

Grutter's
structure
accepts
that
a
university's twin objectives of rewarding
academic merit and fostering diversity can
be complementary rather than competing
goals; that students rising to the top of
underrepresented
groups
demonstrate
promise as future leaders. These students'
relative success in the face of harmful and
widespread stereotypes evidences a degree
of drive, determination, and merit not
captured by test scores alone. Insofar as
Appellants complain that the University's
limited attention to demographics was
inconsistent with the legitimate educational
concerns recognized in Bakke and Grutter,
we conclude that their contention cannot be
sustained.

3.
Appellants argue that a broad approach to
educational diversity is improper because
"critical mass" must be an "inward-facing
concept ... that focuses on the functioning
of the student body," encompassing only

that level of minority enrollment necessary
to ensure that minority students participate
in the classroom and do not feel isolated.
While Appellants' view may comport with
one literal interpretation of the "critical
mass" label, it is not the view that prevailed
in Grutter. The Grutter majority defined
critical mass "by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce," and the educational
benefits recognized in Grutter go beyond the
narrow "pedagogical concept" urged by
Appellants. On this understanding, there is
no reason to assume that critical mass will or
should be the same for every racial group or
every university. We are persuaded, as was
the district court, that the University adhered
to Grutter when it reintroduced race into its
admissions process based in part on an
analysis that devoted special attention to
those
minorities which were most
on
its
significantly underrepresented
campus.

V. THE TOP TEN PERCENT LAW
The parties devote significant attention to
the Top Ten Percent Law. Since the Law
was first enacted in 1997, UT has seen
increases in both African-American and
Hispanic enrollment, but again, changing
demographics and other minority outreach
programs render it difficult to quantify the
increases attributable to the Top Ten Percent
Law.
Appellants put forward the Top Ten Percent
Law as a facially race-neutral alternative
that would allow UT to obtain a critical
mass of minority enrollment without
resorting to race-conscious admissions. As
the argument goes, if the Top Ten Percent
Law were able to serve the University's
interests "about as well" as race-conscious
admissions, without differentiating between
students on the basis of race, then it would
9

render UT's current admissions program
unconstitutional. UT responds that the Top
Ten Percent Law does not constitute a
workable alternative to a flexible admissions
system, and so it is "entirely irrelevant" as a
matter of law in determining whether or not
a university may adopt the holistic
consideration of race to achieve critical
mass.
UT is correct that so-called "percentage
plans" are not a constitutionally mandated
replacement for race-conscious admissions
programs under Gmtter, although-as will
become apparent-this realization alone
does not end our constitutional inquiry. The
idea of percentage plans as a viable
alternative to race-conscious admissions
policies was directly advocated to the
Gmtter Court by the United States, arguing
as amic1Is curiae. In response, the Court
held that although percentage plans may be
a race-neutral means of increasing minority
enrollment, they are not a workable
alternative-at least in a constitutionally
significant sense-because "they may
preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to
assemble a student body that is not just
racially diverse, but diverse along all the
qualities valued by the university." In
addition, the Com1 emphasized existing
percentage plans-including UT's-are
simply not "capable of producing a critical
mass without forcing [universities] to
abandon the academic selectivity that is the
cornerstone of [their] educational mission."

VI. CRITICAL MASS
Appellants contend that UT's decision to
reintroduce race-conscious admissions was
unconstitutional
because
minority
enrollment already met or exceeded "critical
mass" when this decision was made, and
thus any further facial consideration of race

was neither warranted nor constitutional.
Appellants claim the best measure of
whether UT had attained the benefits of
diversity is the raw percentage minorities
enrolled. As a result of the combined effects
of changing demographics, targeted high
school programs, and the Top Ten Percent
Law, total minority enrollment had
increased over the years. When the decision
was made to reintroduce race-conscious
admissions in 2004, underrepresented
minorities made up 21.4% of the incoming
class.
Although Texas was not constitutionally
required to enact the Top Ten Percent Law,
Appellants are correct that the decision to do
so-and the substantial effect on aggregate
minority enrollment at the Universityplaces at risk UT's race-conscious
admissions policies. We are confident, and
hold, that a Gmtter-style admissions system
standing alone is constitutional. That said,
whether to overlay such a plan with the Top
Ten Percent Law and how to calibrate its
flow presents a Hobson's choice between
the minority students it contributes and the
test of constitutional bounds it courts. True
enough, the Top Ten Percent Law is in a
sense, perhaps a controlling sense, a
"facially" race-neutral plan. But it was
animated by effo11s to increase minority
enrollment, and to the extent it succeeds it is
because at key points it proxies for race.

A.
Appellants propose various baseline levels
of diversity which, they suggest, would fully
satisfy the University's interest in attaining
critical mass. They first argue that if "from
13.5 to 20.1 percent" minority enrollment
was adjudged to be great enough diversity
each year by Michigan's Law School in
Gmtter, then the 21.4% minority enrollment
that UT had achieved prior to reintroducing

10

race-conscious admissions must already
have achieved critical mass. We find this
comparison inapt for numerous reasons.
Appellants' comparison presumes that
critical mass must have some fixed upper
bound that applies across different schools,
different degrees, different states, different
years, different class sizes, and different
racial and ethnic subcomposition. It is based
on Appellants' continued insistence that the
concept of critical mass is defined by the
minimum threshold for minority students to
have their ideas represented in class
discussions and not to feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race. As we have
discussed, Gruffer firmly rejects that
premise and defines critical mass by
reference to a broader view of diversity.
Appellants point to the Supreme Court's
observation in United States v. Virginia that
the Virginia Military Institute "could
achieve at least 10% female enrollment-a
sufficient critical mass to provide the female
cadets with a positive educational
experience." But this figure, even if
accurate, covers only one component of the
multi-faceted concept of diversity elaborated
in Gruffer. In any event, the claim that 10%
minority enrollment is a ceiling to critical
mass is confounded by Grutter.
Appellants lastly note that minority
enrollment at UT now exceeds the level it
had reached in the mid-1990s, preHopwood, when the University was free to
obtain any critical mass it wanted through
overtly race-based decisions. UT responds
that it has consistently maintained, both in
the 2004 Proposal and before this Court,
that even before Hopwood it had never
reached critical mass. While UT was making
a greater use of race in that era, its pursuit of
diversity was constrained by other interests,
such as admitting only well-qualified

students. We cannot assume that diversity
levels immediately before Hopwood were
indicative of critical mass. Moreover,
minority enrollment in 1996 is not indicative
of UT's true pre-Hopwood diversity. While
admissions decisions in 1996 were not
controlled by Hopwood, the case impacted
enrollment, resulting in fewer minority
students. If one instead compares minority
enrollment from 1989 to 2004, a different
picture emerges. In 2004, UT enrolled
significantly fewer African-Americans than
it had in 1989 (309 compared to 380). The
decrease in classroom diversity will only
if
additional
minority
continue
representation is not achieved, as the
University plans to increase its number of
course offerings in future years. Finally,
whatever levels of minority enrollment
sufficed more than a decade ago may no
longer constitute critical mass today, given
the social changes Texas has undergone
during the intervening years. Appellants'
proposed baselines are insufficient reason to
doubt UT's considered, good faith
conclusion that "the University still has not
reached a critical mass at the classroom
level. "
Grutter pointedly refused to tie the concept
of "critical mass" to any fixed number. The
Gmtter Court approved of the University of
Michigan Law School's goal of attaining
critical mass even though the school had
specifically abjured any numerical target.
The type of broad diversity Grutter
approved does not lend itself to any fixed
numerical guideposts.

B.

As we have observed, benchmarks aside,
UT's claim that it has not yet achieved
critical mass is less convincing when viewed
against the backdrop of the Top Ten Percent
Law, which had already driven aggregate
11

minority enrollment up to more than onefifth of the University's incoming freshman
class before less subtle race-conscious
admissions were reintroduced.
The chief difficulty with looking to
aggregate minority enrollment is that it
lumps together distinct minority groups
from different backgrounds who may bring
various uniqlle contributions to the
University
environment.
In
Parents
Involved, the Supreme Court specifically
faulted two school districts for employing
"only a limited notion of diversity" that
lumped together very different racial groups.
One school district classified students
exclusively as "white" or "nonwhite";
another labeled them as "black" or "other."
This "binary conception of race" runs
headlong into the central teaching of Gmtter
and other precedents which instruct that a
university must give serious and flexible
consideration to all aspects of diversity.
On this record, we must conclude that the
University has acted with appropriate
sensitivity to these distinctions. Although
the aggregate number of underrepresented
minorities may be large, the enrollment
statistics for individual groups when UT
decided to reintroduce race as a factor in
admissions decisions does not indicate
critical mass was achieved. Further, we
recognize that some year-to-year fluctuation
in enrollment numbers is inevitable, so
statistics from any single year lack probative
force; the University needs to maintain
critical mass in years when yield is low just
as it does when yield is high.

c.
Appellants argue that even if UT had not yet
achieved critical mass under race-neutral
policies, it had come close enough that the
reintroduction of race-conscious measures

was unwarranted. Pointing to the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Parents Involved,
they argue that the University's use of race
is unnecessary, and therefore not narrowly
tailored, because it has only a "minimal
effect." The district court thought this was
an attempt "to force UT into an impossible
catch-22: on the one hand, it is wellestablished that to be narrowly tailored the
means 'must be specifically and narrowly
framed to accomplish' the compelling
interest, but on the other hand, according to
[Appellants], the 'narrowly tailored' plan
must have more than a minimal effect."

Parents Involved does not support the costbenefit analysis that Appellants seek to
invoke. Rather, Parents Involved was
primarily a critique of the school districts'
"extreme approach" that used binary racial
categories to classify schoolchildren. The
Court referred to the "minimal effect"
sought by this policy as evidence that other,
more narrowly tailored means would be
effective to serve the school districts'
interests. The Court did not hold that a
Gmtter-like system would be impermissible
even after race-neutral alternatives have
been exhausted because the gains are small.
To the contrary, Justice Kennedy-who
provided the fifth vote in Parents
Involved-wrote separately to clarify that "a
more nuanced, individual evaluation . . .
informed by Gmtter" would be permissible,
even for the small gains sought by the
school districts.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Mindful of the time frame of this case, we
cannot say that under the circumstances
before us UT breached its obligation to
"serious,
good
faith
undertake
a
consideration" before resorting to raceconscious measures; yet we speak with
caution. In this dynamic environment, our
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conclusions should not be taken to mean that
UT is immune from its obligation to
recalibrate its dual systems of admissions as
needed, and we cannot bless the university's
race-conscious admissions program in
perpetuity. Rather, much like judicial
approval of a state's redistricting of voter
districts, it is good only until the next census
count-it is more a process than a fixed
structure that we review. The University'S
formal and informal review processes will
confront the stark fact that the Top Ten
Percent Law, although soon to be restricted
to 75% of the incoming class, increasingly
places at risk the use of race in admissions.
In 1998, those admitted under the Top Ten
Percent Law accounted for 41 % of the
Texas residents in the freshman class, while
in 2008, top ten percent students comprised
81 % of enrolled Texan freshmen. This
trajectory evidences a risk of eroding the
necessity of using race to achieve critical
mass with accents that may, if persisted in,
increasingly present as an effoti to meet
quantitative goals
drawn from
the
demographics of race and a defiance of the
now-demanded focus upon individuals when
considering race.
A university may decide to pursue the goal
of a diverse student body, and it may do so
to the extent it ties that goal to the
educational benefits that flow from
diversity. The admissions procedures that
UT adopted, modeled after the plan
approved by the Supreme Court in Gruffer,
are narrowly tailored-procedures in some
respects superior to the Grufter plan because
the University does not keep a running tally
of underrepresented minority representation
during the admissions process. We are
satisfied that the University'S decision to
reintroduce race-conscious admissions was
adequately supported by the "serious, good
faith consideration" required by Grutter.

Finally, it is neither our role nor purpose to
dance from Grutter's firm holding that
is
an
interest
supporting
diversity
compelling necessity. Nor are we inclined to
do so. The role of black athletes in the
southern universtttes forty years ago
presents diversity's potential better than can
we, although at that early juncture, it was
ability overcoming a barrier of race.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

KING,
Circuit
concurring:

Judge,

specially

I concur in the judgment and in the analysis
and application of Grutter in Judge
Higginbotham's
opmlOn.
No
party
challenged, in the district court or in this
couti, the validity or the wisdom of the Top
Ten Percent Law. We have no briefing on
those subjects, and the district court did not
consider them. Accordingly, I decline to join
Judge Higginbotham's opinion insofar as it
addresses those subjects.

GARZA,
Circuit
concurring:

Judge,

specially

Today, we follow Grutter's lead in finding
that the University of Texas's raceconscious admissions program satisfies the
Couti's unique application of strict scrutiny
in the university admissions context. I
concur in the majority opinion, because,
despite my belief that Gruffer represents a
digression in the course of constitutional
law, today's opinion is a faithful, if
unfortunate, application of that misstep. The
Supreme Court has chosen this erroneous
path and only the Couti can rectify the error.
In the meantime, I write separately to
underscore this detour from constitutional
first principles.

13

I.
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
State shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XlV. One of
the Amendment's "core principles" is to "do
away with all governmentally imposed
discriminations based on race," and to create
"a Nation of equal citizens in a society
where race is irrelevant to personal
oPPOltunity and achievement." This is why
"[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect and ... call for the
most exacting judicial examination."
In Gruffer, the majority acknowledged these
fundamental principles, but then departed
and held, for the first time, that racial
preferences in university admissions could
be used to serve a compelling state interest.
Though the Court recognized that strict
scrutiny should govern the inquiry into the
use of race in university admissions, what
the Court applied in practice was something
else entirely.

A.
The Grutter majority asserts that "[ s]trict
scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact. '" But since the Court began applying
strict scrutiny to review governmental uses
of race in discriminating between citizens,
the number of cases in which the Court has
permitted such uses can be counted on one
hand. The Court has rejected numerous
intuitively appealing justifications offered
for racial discrimination, such as remedying
general societal discrimination, enhancing
the number of minority professionals
available to work in underserved minority
communities, and providing role models for
minority students. In all of these cases, the

Comi found that the policy goals offered
were insufficiently compelling to justify
discrimination based on race.
In those rare cases where the use of race
properly fmihered a compelling state
interest, the Court has emphasized that the
means chosen must "work the least harm
possible," and be narrowly tailored to fit the
interest "with greater precision than any
alternative means." Moreover, the failure to
consider available race-neutral alternatives
and employ them if efficacious would cause
a program to fail strict scrutiny.
Gruffer changed this. After finding that
racial diversity at the University of
Michigan Law School ("Law School") was a
compelling governmental interest, the Court
redefined the meaning of narrow tailoring.
The Couli replaced narrow tailoring's
conventional "least restrictive means"
requirement with a regime that encourages
opacity and is incapable of meaningful
judicial review under any level of scrutiny.
Courts now simply assume, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that university
administrators have acted in good faith in
pursuing racial diversity, and courts are
required to defer to their educational
judgments on how best to achieve it. What is
more, the deference called for in Gruffer
seems to allow universities, rather than the
courts, to determine when the use of racial
preferences is no longer compelling. This
new species of strict scrutiny ensures that
only those admissions programs employing
the most heavy-handed racial preferences,
and those programs foolish enough to
maintain and provide conclusive data, will
to
"exacting
judicial
be
subject
examination." Others, like the University of
Michigan in Gruller, and the University of
Texas here, can get away with something
less.
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B.
In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law
School sought to achieve a student body that
was both academically strong and diverse
along several dimensions, including race.
There, the Court endorsed the Law School's
"highly individualized, holistic review of
each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant
might contribute to a diverse educational
environment." The Court noted approvingly
that the Law School had "no policy ... of
automatic acceptance or rejection based on
any single 'soft' variable." The Grutter
majority permitted the use of race and
ethnicity as "plus" factors within the Law
School's holistic review, but this simply
raises the question: how much of a plus?
Grutter did not say.
Instead, the Comi implicitly forbade
universities
from
quantifying
racial
preferences in their admissions calculus.
Contrasting the admissions system found
unconstitutional in Gratz, the Grutter
majority noted that "the Law School awards
no mechanical, predetermined diversity
'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity." On
this view, rigid point systems that allocate
preference points for racial and ethnic status
are unconstitutional because they "preclude[
] admissions counselors from conducting the
type of individualized consideration the
Court's opinion in Grutter requires."
But it is not clear, to me at least, how using
race in the holistic scoring system approved
in Grutter is constitutionally distinct from
the point-based system rejected in Gratz. If
two applicants, one a preferred minority and
one nonminority, with application packets
identical in all respects save race would be
assigned the same score under a holistic
scoring system, but one gets a higher score

when race is factored in, how is that
different from the mechanical group-based
boost prohibited in Gratz? Although one
system quantifies the preference and the
other does not, the result is the same: a
determinative benefit based on race.
Grutter's
new
terminology
like
"individualized consideration" and "holistic
review" tends to conceal this result. By
obscuring the University of Michigan's use
of race in these diffuse tests, the Court
allowed the Law School to do covertly what
the undergraduate program could not do
overtly.

c.
Grutter found that the Law School had a
compelling interest in "securing the
educational benefits of a diverse student
body," and that achieving a "critical mass"
of racially diverse students was necessary to
accomplish that goal. The Law School
defined "critical mass" as "a number that
encourages
underrepresented
minority
students to participate in the classroom and
not feel isolated ... or like spokespersons
for their race." The Court clarified: "critical
mass is defined by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce." Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion identified three such
constitutionally relevant benefits:
(i)
increased perspective in the classroom; (ii)
improved professional training; and (iii)
enhanced civic engagement.
My difficulty with Grutter's "educational
benefits of diversity" discussion is that it
remains suspended at the highest levels of
hypothesis and speculation. And unlike
ordinary hypotheses, which must be testable
to be valid, Grutter's thesis is incapable of
testing.
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1.
The first constitutionally relevant benefit
that makes up Grutter's compelling interest
is racial diversity's direct impact in the
classroom. Here, the Court concluded that
diverse perspectives improve the overall
quality of education because "classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening and interesting
when students have the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds."
Assuming a critical mass of minority
students could perceptibly improve the
quality of classroom learning, how would
we measure success?
My concern with allowing viewpoint
diversity's alleged benefits to justify racial
preference is that viewpoint diversity is too
theoretical and abstract. If all a university
"need do is find ... report[s]," studies, or
surveys to implement a race-conscious
admissions policy, "the constraints of the
Equal Protection Clause will, in effect, have
been rendered a nullity. Gruffer permits
race-based preferences on nothing more than
intuition-the type that strict scrutiny is
designed to protect against.
The
Constitution
prohibits
state
decisionmakers from presuming that groups
of individuals, whether classified by race,
ethnicity, or gender, share such a quality
collectively. There is no one AfricanAmerican or Hispanic viewpoint, and, in
fact, Grutter approved the Law School's
diversity rationale precisely because of the
role that racial diversity can play in
dispelling such falsehoods.
Gruffer sought to have it both ways. The
Court held that racial diversity was
necessary to eradicate the notion that
minority students think and behave, not as

individuals, but as a race. At the same time,
the Court approved a policy granting racebased preferences on the assumption that
racial status correlates with greater diversity
of viewpoints.

2.
second asserted educational
benefit of diversity relates to improved
professional training. Such training is
essential, the argument goes, for future
leaders who will eventually work within and
supervise a racially diverse workforce.
Grlltter's

State universities are free to define their
educational goals as broadly as needed to
serve the public interest. We defer to
educators' professional judgments in setting
those goals. My concern, discussed
throughout this opinion, is not that Grutter
commands such deference, but that it
conflated the deference owed to a
university'S asserted interest with deference
to the means used to attain it.
There is, however, one aspect of the Court's
"improved professional training" rationale
that I find especially troubling. While
Grlltter made much of the role that
educational institutions play in providing
professional training, the cases the Comi
relied on involved primary and secondary
schools. I question whether these cases
apply with equal force in the context of
higher education, where academic goals are
vastly different from those pursued in
elementary
and
secondary
schools.
Moreover,
a
university'S
self-styled
educational goals, for example, promoting
"cross-racial understanding" and enabling
students "to better understand persons of
different races," could just as easily be
facilitated in many other public settings
where diverse people assemble regularly. I
do not believe that the university has a
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monopoly on furthering these societal goals,
or even that the university is in the best
position to further such goals.

3.
Finally, Grutter articulated a third benefit of
racial diversity in higher education:
enhancing civic engagement. Here, the
Court wrote that:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must
have confidence in the openness and
integrity of educational institutions that
provide this training.... Access to [higher]
education ... must be inclusive of talented
and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity, so that all members of our
heterogeneous society may participate in the
educational institutions that provide the
training and education necessary to succeed
in America.
Unlike the first two "educational benefits of
diversity," which focused on improving
classroom discussion and professional
training, this third claimed benefit plainly
has nothing to do with the university's core
education and training functions. Instead,
Grutter is concerned here with role that
higher education plays in a democratic
society, and the Court suggests that
affirmative action at public universities can
advance a societal goal of encouraging
minority participation in civic life. This
proposition lacks foundation.
If a significant portion of a minority
community sees our nation's leaders as
illegitimate or lacks confidence in the
integrity of our educational institutions, as

Grutter posits in the block quote above, I
doubt that suspending the prevalent
constitutional rules to allow preferred
treatment for as few as 15--40 students, is
likely to foster renewed civic participation
from among that community as a whole.
D.

Finally, by using metaphors, like "critical
mass," and indefinite terms that lack
conceptual or analytical precision, but rather
sound in abject subjectivity, to dress up
constitutional standards, Grutter fails to
provide any predictive value to courts and
university administrators tasked with
applying these standards consistently. And
notwithstanding the Court's nod to
federalism, Grutter's ambiguity discourages
States from experimenting or depmiing from
the one accepted norm. In the absence of
clear
guidance,
public
universities
nationwide will simply model their
programs after the one approved in Grutter
rather than struggle with the risks and
uncertain benefits of experimentation. That
is exactly what has occurred here. With one
exception-the Top Ten Percent law-the
race-conscious admissions policy that we
review today is identical to the program
used at the Law School.
II.

As mentioned at the outset, I concur in the
opinion because I believe today's decision is
a faithful application of Grutter's teachings,
however flawed I may find those teachings
to be. I am compelled to follow the Court's
unusual deference towards public university
administrators in their assessment that racial
diversity is a compelling interest, as well as
the Court's refashioned narrow-tailoring
inquiry. My difficulty is not necessarily with
today's decision, but with the one that drives
it. Nonetheless, there is one aspect of Judge
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Higginbotham's thoughtful OpInIOn that
gives me pause about whether Grutter
compels the result we reach today.
Ultimately, and regrettably, I recognize that
the deference called for by Grutter may
make this concern superfluous.
As today's opinion notes, the University of
Texas's race-conscious admissions policy is
nearly indistinguishable from the program
approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.
As such, the majority opinion summarily
finds that, like the Law School in Gruffer,
the University of Texas has a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits
of diversity in its undergraduate program.
After affording all deference due, today's
decision focuses on the efficacy of the
University's race-conscious admissions
policy. In my view, the efficacy of the
University's race-based admissions policy is
more than merely relevant, it is dispositive.
The controlling question is, "Is the
University of Texas's race-conscious policy
effective?" The constitutional inquiry for me
concerns whether the University's program
meaningfully furthers its intended goal of
increasing racial diversity on the road to
critical mass. I find it does not.
In the 2008 admissions cycle, 29,501
students applied to the University of Texas.
Less than half, 12,843, were admitted and
6,715 ultimately enrolled. Of these enrolled
students, 6,322 came from Texas high
schools. 5,114 (80.9% of enrolled Texas
residents) of these students were a product
of Top Ten Percent, meaning that, at most,
1,208 (19.1%) enrolled non-Top Ten
Percent Texas residents had been evaluated
on the basis of their AI/PAl scores.
Of the 363 African-American freshmen
from Texas high schools that were admitted
and enrolled (6% of the 6,322-member

enrolling class from Texas high schools),
305 (4.8%) were a product of Top Ten
Percent, while 58 (0.92%) AfricanAmerican enrollees had been evaluated on
the basis of their AI/PAl scores. For the
1,322 (21 %) total enrolled in-state Hispanic
students, 1,164 (18.4% of enrolled in-state
students) were a product of Top Ten
Percent, while 158 (2.5%) had been
evaluated on the basis of their AIIP AI
scores. We know that in some cases an
applicants' AI score is high enough that the
applicant is granted admission based on that
score alone. But we do not have data to
show how many of these 58 AfricanAmerican and 158 Hispanic students were
admitted automatically based on their AI
scores, which are race-neutral, and how
many were admitted after factoring in the
students' P AI scores, which use the
University's Grutter-like holistic evaluation
plan and include consideration of an
applicant's race as one of seven "special
circumstances." Nonetheless, assuming that
all 58 and 158 African-American and
Hispanic students, respectively, were
admitted on the basis of their combined Al
and PAl scores, the question is whether the
University's use of race, which is a "highly
suspect tool," as part of the PAl score
contributes a statistically significant enough
number of minority students to affect critical
mass at the University of Texas.
We do not know, because the University
does not maintain data, the degree to which
race influenced the University's admissions
decisions for any of these enrolled students
or how many of these students would not
have been admitted but-for the use of race as
a plus factor. But assuming the University
gave race decisive weight in each of these
58 African-American and 158 Hispanic
students' admissions decisions, those
students would still only constitute 0.92%
and 2.5%, respectively, of the entire 6,322-
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person enrolling in-state freshman class.

III.
The Supreme Court's narrow tailoring
jurisprudence has been reliably tethered, at
least before 2003, to the principle that
whenever the government divides citizens
by race, which is itself an evil that can only
be justified in the most compelling
circumstances, that the means chosen will
inflict the least harm possible, and fit the
compelling goal "so closely that there is
little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification
was
illegitimate
racial
prejudice or stereotype." Grutter abandoned
this principle and substituted in its place an
amorphous, untestable, and above all,
hopelessly deferential standard that ensures
that race-based preferences in university
admissions will avoid meaningful judicial
review for the next several decades.

Government-sponsored discrimination IS
repugnant to the notion of human equality
and is more than the Constitution can bear.
There are no de minimis violations of the
Equal Protection Clause, and when
government undertakes any level of racebased social engineering, the costs are
enormous. Not only are race-based policies
inherently
divisive,
they
reinforce
stereotypes that groups of people, because of
their race, gender, or ethnicity, think alike or
have common life experiences. The Court
has
condemned
such
class-based
presumptions repeatedly.
Yesterday's racial discrimination was based
on racial preference; today's racial
preference results in racial discrimination.
Like the plaintiffs and countless other
college applicants denied admission based,
in part, on government-sponsored racial
discrimination, I await the Court's return to
constitutional first principles.
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"Justices Take Up Race as a Factor in College Entry"
The New York Times
February 21,2012
Adam Liptak
In a 2003 decision that the majority said it
expected would last for 25 years, the
Supreme COUli allowed public colleges and
universities to take account of race in
admission decisions. On Tuesday, the court
signaled that it might end such affirmative
action much sooner than that.
By agreeing to hear a major case involving
race-conscious admissions at the University
of Texas, the court thrust affirmative action
back into the public and political discourse
after years in which it had mostly faded
from view. Both supporters and opponents
of affirmative action said they saw the
announcement-and the change in the
court's makeup since 2003-as a signal that
the court's five more conservative members
might be prepared to do away with racial
preferences in higher education.
The consequences of such a decision would
be striking. It would, all sides agree, reduce
the number of African-American and Latino
students at nearly every selective college
and graduate school, with more AsianAmerican and white students gaining
entrance instead.
A decision barring the use of race in
admission decisions would undo an
accommodation reached in the Supreme
COUli's 5-to-4 decision in 2003 in Grutter v.
Bollinger: that public colleges and
universities could not use a point system to
increase minority enrollment but could take
race into account in vaguer ways to ensure
academic diversity.
Supporters of affirmative action reacted with

alarm to the cOUli's decision to hear the
case. "I think it's ominous," said Lee
Bollinger, the president of Columbia
University, who as president of the
University of Michigan was a defendant in
the Grutter case. "It threatens to undo
several decades of effort within higher
education to build a more integrated and just
and educationally enriched environment."
Opponents saw an opportunity to strike a
decisive blow on an issue that had partly
faded from view. "Any form of
discrimination, whether it's for or against, is
wrong," said Hans von Spakovsky, a legal
fellow at the Heritage Foundation, who
added that his daughter was applying to
college. "The idea that she might be
discriminated against and not be admitted
because of her race is incredible to me."
Arguments in the new case are likely to be
heard just before the presidential election in
November, and they may force the
candidates to weigh in on a long dormant
and combustible issue that has divided the
electorate. There was little immediate
reaction from the campaign trail and in
official Washington on Tuesday, which may
be attributable to the political risks the issue
presents
to
both
Democrats
and
Republicans.
Some polls show that a narrow majority of
Americans support some forms
of
affirmative action, though much depends on
how the question is framed, and many
people have at least some reservations.
The new case, Fishel' v. University of
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Texas, No. 11-345, was brought by Abigail
Fisher, a white student who says the
University of Texas denied her admission
because of her race. The case has
idiosyncrasies that may limit its reach, but it
also has the potential to eliminate diversity
as a rationale sufficient to justify any use of
race in admission decisions-the rationale
the court endorsed in the Grutter decision.
Diversity, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote,
encourages
lively
classroom
discussions, fosters cross-racial harmony
and cultivates leaders seen as legitimate. But
critics say there is only a weak link between
racial and academic diversity.
The Grutter decision allowed but did not
require states to take account of race in
admissions.
Several states,
including
California and Michigan, forbid the practice,
and public universities in those states have
seen a drop in minority admissions. In other
states and at private institutions, officials
generally look to race and ethnicity as one
factor among many, leading to the
admission of significantly more black and
Hispanic students than basing the decisions
strictly on test scores and grades would.
A Supreme COUl1 decision forbidding the
use of race in admission at public
universities would almost ce11ainly mean
that it would be barred at most private ones
as well under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which forbids racial
discrimination in programs that receive
federal money. In her majority opinion in
Grutter, Justice O'Connor said the day
would come when "the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary" in
admission decisions to foster educational
diversity. She said she expected that day to
arrive in 25 years, or in 2028. Tuesday's
decision to revisit the issue suggests the
deadline may arrive just a decade after
Gruffer.

The court's membership has changed since
2003, most notably with the appointment of
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., who replaced
Justice O'Connor in 2006. Justice Alito has
voted with the court's more conservative
justices in decisions hostile to government
use of racial classification.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has been
of government
particularly
skeptical
programs that take account of race. "Racial
balancing is not transformed from 'patently
unconstitutional' to a compelling state
interest simply by relabeling it 'racial
diversity, '" he wrote in a 2007 decision
limiting the use of race to achieve
integration in public school districts.
Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas agreed. Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, the court's swing justice, also
voted to invalidate the programs. But he was
less categorical, sharply limiting the role
race could play in children's school
assignments but stopping short of forbidding
school districts from ever taking account of
race. Still, Justice Kennedy has never voted
to uphold an affirmative action program.
In Texas, students in the top 10 percent of
high schools are automatically admitted to
the public university system, a policy that
does not consider race but increases racial
diversity in part because so many high
schools are racially homogenous. Ms. Fisher
just missed that cutoff at her high school in
Sugar Land, Tex., and then entered a
separate pool of applicants who can be
admitted through a complicated system in
which race plays an unquantified but
significant role. She sued in 2008.
Ms. Fisher is soon to graduate from
Louisiana State University. Lawyers for the
University of Texas said that meant she had
not suffered an injury that a court decision
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could address, meaning she does not have
standing to sue.
Ms. Fisher's argument is that Texas cannot
have it both ways. Having implemented a
race-neutral program to increase minority
admissions, she says, Texas may not
supplement it with a race-conscious one.
Texas officials said the additional effort was
needed to make sure that individual
classrooms contained a "critical mass" of
minority students.
The lower federal courts ruled for the state.

Chief Judge Edith Jones of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
dissenting from the full appeals court's
decision not to rehear Ms. Fisher's case, was
skeptical of state officials' rationale. "Will
classroom diversity 'suffer' in areas like
applied math, kinesiology, chemistry, Farsi
or hundreds of other subjects if, by chance,
few or no students of a certain race are
enrolled?" she asked.
Justice Elena Kagan disqualified herself
from hearing the case, presumably because
she had worked on it as solicitor general.
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"In Fisher v. Texas, Look at the Politics"
The New York Times
February 23,2012
Ian Haney-Lopez
We should expect the Supreme Court in
Fisher v. Texas to declare affirmative action
unconstitutional.
To
understand
this
decision, ignore the social reality of
continued racial inequality. Focus instead on
electoral politics past and present.

Instead, conservative justices wielded their
power against affirmative action. They
ended efforts to use race to promote
integration in contracting, employment and
voting-and, with Fisher, likely higher
education.

Starting with Richard Nixon, conservative
politicians campaigned against the Supreme
Court, using it as a foil in the culture wars.
Forced busing, affirmative action, the
coddling of criminals-these supposed
offenses were charged to the court, and then
used to mobilize voters discomfited by
recent racial progress. Beyond race-baiting,
other choice phrases included school prayer,
abortion on demand, and tolerance for the
homosexual lifestyle. In the 40 years
preceding
Barack Obama's
election,
Republicans elected on these themes held
the presidency for 28 years-and appointed
12 of the 14 justices elevated to the court.

These dramatic reversals occUlTed in fits and
starts. After a notable pause, are-energized
bloc is marching again. Two especially
devastating developments loom. The court
seems intent on making federal laws
banning discrimination as ineffective as
they've rendered the constitution III
detecting racial mistreatment; and also
poised to extend the ban on affirmative
action to corporations, private hospitals,
foundations and unions. If these come to
pass, the court will have curtailed every
direct means of achieving an integrated
society.

The net result for racial justice can be easily
summarized. The court stopped seeing in the
Constitution a source of protection for
minorities: after 1980, it virtually never
found mistreatment against nonwhites.

Once again, today's presidential campaign
resounds with themes of gay marriage,
abortion, contraception and now affirmative
action-issues guaranteed to inform judicial
appointments. In 2012, vote as if racial
justice depends upon it.
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"The Future of Affirmative Action: Kennedy is the Key"
Huff Post Politico
March 6, 2012
Stephen Menendian
The United States Supreme Court recently
agreed to take up the case of Fisher v.
University of Texas. The case will once
more put the issue of affirmative action
squarely into national focus just eight years
after the Court upheld the use of race in the
University of Michigan's admissions
decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger. By a 5-4
vote, the Court in Grutter upheld the use of
race in university admissions, but placed
strict limits on the practice. Now that the
composition of the Court has changed,
attention will fall on Justice Kennedy, the
current Comi's critical swing vote. Since
recent appointee Justice Kagan has recused
herself from the case, on account of her
participation in these cases in her previous
role as solicitor general, the stakes are
higher than ever. One way or the other,
Justice Kennedy will decide the fate of
affirmative action. His dissenting opinion in
Grutter is a roadmap to the outcome in
Fisher.
The Court in Grutter held that promoting
racial diversity in institutions of higher
education is a compelling governmental
interest that serves to ensure that the
pathways of opportunity are open to persons
of all backgrounds and races. This is
especially true for flagship institutions such
as the University of Michigan or the
University of Texas. The Court also
emphasized the impOliance of diversity for
these institutions in terms of our broader
democratic society. The Court reasoned that
if the training grounds for our nation's
leaders were not "visibly open to talented
and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity," then these institutions-and our

democracy more generally-might lose
"legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry." In
addition, the Court underscored the vital
importance of academic freedom, of giving
universities the flexibility they need to select
the student body that will prepare their
students for academic success. The Court
explained that creating a diverse student
body promotes the exchange of diverse
viewpoints, reduces stereotyping and
prejudice,
and
generates cross-racial
understanding.
While the Court upheld the University of
Michigan
Law
School's
admissions
procedure, the Comi placed strict limits on
such decision-making to safeguard the
interests of nonminority students. The Court
required that any race-conscious admissions
procedure be "narrowly tailored." The Court
indicated that a narrowly tailored process
would include consideration of race-neutral
alternatives and would apply a 'holistic'
approach to admissions decision-making,
ensuring that race is not a decisive factor in
any given admissions determination. In
particular, a university may not set a quota
or pursue a numerical target, but may seek
of
to
enroll
a
'critical
mass'
underrepresented students. In a companion
decision, the Court struck down the
University of Michigan's undergraduate
admissions procedure for failing to meet the
requirements of narrow tailoring.
Ultimately, Grutter was decided by a 5-4
vote. While Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, held that the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions plan
was narrowly tailored, Justice Kennedy
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remained unconvinced. To explain his
disagreement, Justice Kennedy authored a
OpInIOn.
Justice
separate,
dissenting,
Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Grutter
provides a clear roadmap for his ruling in
Fisher.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy
agreed with Justice O'Connor that the
proper rule for evaluating affirmative action
derives from Justice Powell's opinion in the
1970s Bakke decision, an opinion had not
enjoyed clear support of a majority of the
Court until Grutter. In his opinion in Bakke,
Justice Powell asserted that promoting
diversity is a compelling government
interest that would justify the use of raceconscious admissions. However, such a
program must be narrowly tailored to
safeguard the rights of innocent nonminority students. Therefore, it follows that
Justice Kennedy, like Justice O'Connor,
believes that promoting racial diversity is a
compelling governmental interest, and
would uphold any affirmative action
program that is narrowly tailored. However,
unlike Justice O'Connor, who voted to
uphold the University of Michigan Law
School's holistic admissions plan, Justice
Kennedy did not believe that University of
Michigan's diversity plan was narrowly
tailored. In particular, Justice Kennedy cited
the fact that the narrow fluctuation band of
minority enrollment over the years
"subverted individual determination." In
addition, Justice Kennedy was concerned
that the undue attention to the 'daily
reports',
which
updated
university
admissions administrators on the number of
minority applications accepted, undermined
the individualized review throughout the
entire admissions process.
Given Justice Kennedy's agreement broad
agreement with Justice O'Connor that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is the

proper rule for reviewing affirmative action
policies, the Fisher decision will not result in
the end of affirmative action. It does,
however, seem likely that the Court in
Fisher, in a 5-3 decision (since Kagan will
not have a vote), will strike down the use of
race in admissions currently employed by
the University of Texas for failing the
narrowly tailoring requirement.
The University of Texas currently reviews
two pools for its undergraduate programs.
By law, any student graduating in the top
10% of their high school class is
automatically admitted to the University of
Texas. The top 10% law was passed in the
last 1990s following a federal case that
struck down the University's affirmative
action plan. The 10% ironically relies on
underlying patterns of de facto segregation
throughout the state to ensure diversity in
the University's undergraduate programs.
The vast majority of the students admitted to
the University are enrolled through the top
10% law. The remaining applicants are then
subject to the holistic race-conscIous
admissions procedure.
Ultimately, the Fisher case will more finely
determine the kinds of restrictions that will
be imposed on permissible affirmative
action plans. Although the Petitioner,
Abigail Fisher, argues that no consideration
of race should be allowed, the COUli will not
lay down such a rule. Justice Kennedy,
writing on behalf of the Court, will not vote
to prohibit affirmative action, but will likely
clarify the kinds of narrow tailoring
requirements that are required to satisfy
strict scrutiny and safeguard the rights of
non-minority applicants under the equal
protection clause.
The Fisher decision will likely resemble the
Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 decisions from
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2007 in which Justice Kennedy voted to
strike down the voluntary integration plans
at issue, but made clear that avoiding the
harms of racial isolation and promoting
racial diversity in K-12 education are
compelling governmental interests, and set
forth various methods by which it may be
permissibly achieved. Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy went out of his way to underscore
the necessity of such plans for the future of
our nation, given the endemic inequities in
our K-12 system.
Although affirmative action will not be
eliminated as a result of this case, the
ultimate resolution is likely to be fact
intensive. The precise range of minorities
admitted under the general admissions pool
will be carefully scrutinized. The success of

the 10% plan in achieving an increase in
minority enrollment may well doom the
chances for arguing that additional raceconscious mechanisms are necessary to
achieve a diverse student body. Each of
these questions and more will be thoroughly
argued and debated. Should Justice Kennedy
make it practically impossible to achieve
meaningful diversity using affirmative
action, creative race-neutral alternatives
designed to promote diversity in higher
education, such as the 10% plan, more
intensive recruitment of minority students to
boost applicant pools, or examination of
race proxies such growing up in
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, will
likely become the focus of future efforts
promote diversity in higher education.
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"Obama Lawyers Urge High Court to Back Affirmative Action"
Bloomberg
August 13,2012
Greg Stohr
The Obama administration urged the U.S.
Supreme Court to reaffirm the legality of
race-based college admissions, as the
justices prepare to review the affirmative
action programs that have become fixtures at
the nation's top universities [in Fisher v.
University of Texas].
The high court will hear arguments Oct. 10
on a white woman's contention that she
suffered racial discrimination when the
University of Texas rejected her application
for admission.
The case has broad implications for selective
universities, almost all of which use race as
an admissions factor to diversify their
student bodies. In a 35-page brief filed
today, the administration sought to make the
issue one of national security, saying the
military, Federal Bureau of Investigation
and Depatiment of Homeland Security all
rely on universities to produce a steady
stream of diverse graduates.
"The United States has a critical interest in
ensuring that educational institutions are
able to provide the educational benefits of
diversity," U.S. Solicitor General Donald
Verrilli argued in a brief signed by officials
in six federal departments, including the
Pentagon.

Bakke Case
Universities have had the couti's blessing
for affirmative action since the 1978
Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke
decision
gave
race-conscious
admissions a limited endorsement. The court

reaffirmed that ruling in 2003, saying in
Grutter v. Bollinger that universities can
consider race in admissions as long as they
don't do so mechanistically.
With five of the nine current justices openly
skeptical about racial classifications, the
2003 decision may now be in jeopardy.
Today was the deadline for outside groups
to file briefs supporting Texas in the case.
Among those siding with the university was
a group of 59 companies, including
Microsoft Corp. (MSFT) and Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. (WMT)
The companies said they "must be able to
hire highly trained employees of all races,
religions,
cultures
and
economIC
backgrounds."
Colin Powell, the former secretary of state
and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
joined a group of retired military leaders
who also urged the court to side with Texas.

"Enormous Consequences"
The rejected student, Abigail Noel Fisher,
says the university is violating the 14th
Amendment's equal protection clause.
"If any state action should respect racial
equality, it is university admission," Fisher's
lawyers argued in a court filing in May.
"Selecting those who will benefit from the
limited places available at universities has
enormous consequences for the future of
American students and the perceived
fairness of government action."
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Texas uses a system that combines racial
preferences with a rule that guarantees
admission to state residents who graduate in
the top 10 percent of their high school class.
The so-called Top Ten Percent Law was
designed in part to boost minority
admissions at state universities.
One issue for the Supreme Court will be
whether the hybrid nature of Texas's
approach undermines the rationale for racebased admissions. A federal appeals court in
New Orleans upheld the Texas system.

Racial Role
Fisher's lawyers point to statistics indicating
that the Top Ten Percent Law, enacted in
1997, was helping ensure a significant
number of minority students even without
explicit consideration of race.
The state says it uses race in a more limited
way than the University of Michigan Law
School in the 2003 case. Texas says that,
unlike Michigan, it doesn't track the racial
composition of its entering class during the

admissions process. Texas also says it
doesn't have numerical goals for minority
admissions.
"The fact that race has only a modest and
nuanced role in admissions decisions is not a
constitutional problem," the university
argued in court papers filed last week. "It is
the hallmark of the type of plan this Court
has held out as constitutional since Bakke. "
The case will test the impact of the court's
changed makeup, particularly the 2006
retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
who wrote the 2003 opinion, and the
appointment of her successor, Justice
Samuel Alito.
Alito was in the majority in a 2007 decision
that put new limits on public school
integration efforts-and raised questions
about the viability of other race-based
government policies.
The case, which the court probably will
decide in the first half of 2013, is Fisher v.
University of Texas at Allstin, 11- 345.

28

"The Next Big Affirmative-Action Case"
The Chronicle ofHigher Education
January 27,2011
Richard Kahlenberg

Last week, a three-judge panel of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a
decision supporting a racial affirmativeaction program at the University of Texas.
Today, a Nevil York Times editorial
applauded the decision and concluded, "This
ruling should give confidence to all
universities about seeking diversity and
merit."
Far from glvmg confidence, however, the
decision may well have set the stage for a
U.S. Supreme Court ruling that will severely
undercut, if not oveliurn, the 2003 Grlltter v.
Bollinger decision affirming the use of race
in admissions.
In the Fifth Circuit case, Fisher v. Texas,
white plaintiffs challenged the use of race in
admissions, arguing that Texas's Top 10
Percent plan-which automatically admits
those in the top 10 percent of their high
school class-creates sufficient racial
diversity by itself. Plaintiffs noted that using
race-blind criteria produced a class that was
4.5 percent African-American and 16.9
percent Hispanic in 2004, so the subsequent
reintroduction of race on top of the Ten
Percent plan is unconstitutional. (In Grlltter,
a law-school class that ranged between 13.5
and 20.1 percent minority was considered to
have achieved a "critical mass" of such
students.)
On the surface, the three-judge Fifth Circuit
panel decision was unanimously supportive
of the University of Texas, but as Peter
Schmidt noted in The Chronicle, "the judges
were deeply divided in their reasoning." In
particular, Judge Emilio Garza's opinion,

though technically a "special concurrence,"
was highly critical of affirmative action,
calling it unnecessary. He noted that in the
2008 admissions cycle, of the 363 African
American freshmen from Texas admitted
and enrolled, 305 were the product of the
Top Ten Percent plan, and just 58 were
admitted through merit or a combination of
merit and race. For in-state Hispanics, 1,322
were admitted through the Top Ten Percent
plan and just 158 through merit or a
combination or merit and ethnicity. He
concluded, "the University of Texas's use of
race has had an infinitesimal impact on
critical mass in the student body as a
whole." The finding is impOliant because
the Supreme Court used the minimal impact
of race in K-12 integration plans in
Louisville and Seattle to suggest the use of
race was not really necessary.
Judge Garza's opinion is replete with
quotations from decisions by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, the new swing vote on
the Supreme Court. Garza homed in on
Kennedy's 2007 declaration that the
individual classification of students by race
should be used only as "a last resort."
Kennedy notably dissented in Grlltter,
saying the Court should "force educational
institutions to seriously explore race-neutral
alternatives. "
Garza calls for the U.S. Supreme COUli to
overturn Grlltter, but it seems more likely to
me that while the conservatives (Justices
Robelis, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito) might
be willing to take that step, Justice Kennedy
would be more comfortable gutting Gmtter,
without overturning it, by vigorously
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enforcing the decision's requirement to look
to alternatives before using race. The
practical implication would be for
universities to earnestly employ class-based
affirmative action and top-percent plans,
reserving race for extreme cases.
It is telling that the Center for Equal
Opportunity's president, Roger Clegg, a
strong opponent of affirmative action, said
he saw the Fifth Circuit's Fisher decision as
positive in several respects. The division
within the panel invites a resolution from the
Supreme Couti, he argued. The loss for the
plaintiffs assures that the case will be
appealed to the Supreme Court. (Had Texas

lost, it might have declined to appeal for fear
of setting a negative national precedent in
the Supreme Couti.) And the Circuit Court
decision came quickly, increasing the
chances that the Supreme Court, in its
current conservative makeup, will hear the
case.
All of this suggests that the survival of
Grutter is in serious question. Those who
care about diversity should begin their
contingency planning now, exploring raceneutral alternatives that will reach the sorts
of economically disadvantaged populations
that universities should have been pursuing
all along.
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"Asians and Affirmative Action"
Inside Higher Ed
March 30, 2012
Scott Jaschik
A brief filed Tuesday with the U.S. Supreme
Court seeks to shake up the legal and
political calculus of a case that could
determine the constitutionality of programs
in which colleges consider the race or
ethnicity of applicants. In the brief, four
Asian-American organizations call on the
justices to bar all race-conscious admissions
decisions, arguing that race-neutral policies
are the only way for Asian-American
applicants to get a fair shake.

caution that the new briefs have
oversimplified
a
complicated
issue,
identifying the wrong culprit and ignoring
the benefits some Asian Americans receive
from affirmative action. Generally, those
Asian-American leaders backing affirmative
action stress the significant diversity among
Asian-American students in the United
States-including many recent immigrants
who are not achieving instant academic
success.

Much of the discussion of the case has
focused on policies that help black and
Latino applicants. And the suit that has
reached the U.S. Supreme Court was filed
on behalf of a white woman, Abigail Fisher,
who was rejected by the University of Texas
at Austin.

The case before the Supreme COUli
challenges the right of UT-Austin to
consider race and ethnicity when it has been
able to achieve some levels of diversity in
the student body through a race-neutral
means: the" I 0 percent" law that has assured
all graduates in the top 10 percent of high
schools in the state admission into any
public university in the state. The university
maintains that it should have the right to use
other measures as well, and two lower courts
have backed that position. Fisher's lawyers
disagree.

But the new brief, along with one recently
filed on behalf of Fisher, say that the policy
at Texas and similar policies elsewhere hurt
Asian-American applicants, not just white
applicants. This view runs counter to the
opinion of many Asian-American groups
that have consistently backed affirmative
action programs such as those in place at
Texas.
It is impossible to know how much weight
the Asian-American issue will have with the
justices. But the briefs have renewed a
debate about who benefits-and who
loses-from race-conscious admissions.
While the briefs portray Asian Americans as
victims of affirmative action, other AsianAmerican groups are planning a brief
backing affirmative action, and some experts
on Asian-American educational trends

One test the Supreme Court has set for raceconscious decisions by public entities is that
such efforts must be "narrowly tailored,"
and the briefs focused on Asian-American
applicants appear to suggest that the Texas
program cannot meet that test in pati
because the programs are (in the plaintiffs
view) hurting some minority students to help
others.
The brief filed Tuesday on behalf of AsianAmerican groups Tuesday focused less on
the Texas admissions policy than on the
consideration of race generally in college
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admissions. "Admission to the nation's top
universities and colleges is a zero-sum
proposition. As aspiring applicants capable
of graduating from these institutions
outnumber available seats, the utilization of
race as a 'plus factor' for some inexorably
applies race as a 'minus factor' against those
on the other side of the equation.
Particularly hard-hit are Asian-American
students, who demonstrate academic
excellence at disproportionately high rates
but often find the value of their work
discounted on account of either their race, or
nebulous criteria alluding to it," says the
brief.
It was filed on behalf of the 80-20 National
Asian-American Educational Foundation,
the National Federation of Indian American
Associations, the Indian American Forum
for Political Education, the Global
Organization of People of Indian Origin and
the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human
Rights Under Law. (The latter group focuses
on discrimination against Jewish Americans,
and the brief argues that today's admissions
policies have the same impact on Asianas
prevIOUS
American
applicants
generations' policies had on Jewish
applicants.)

The brief focuses heavily on research studies
such as the work that produced the 2009
book, No Longer Separate, Not Yet Eq1lal:
Race and Class in Elite College Admission
and Camp1ls Life (Princeton University
Press), which argued that-when controlling
for various factors--one could find the
relative "advantage" in admissions of
members of different ethnic and racial
groups.
The book suggested that private institutions
essentially admit black students with SAT
scores 310 points below those of comparable
white students. And the book argued that

Asian-American applicants need SAT scores
140 points higher than those of white
students to stand the same chances of
admission. The brief also quotes from
accounts of guidance counselors and others
(including this account in Inside Higher Ed)
talking about widely held beliefs in high
schools with many Asian-American students
that they must have higher academic
credentials than all others to gain admission
to elite institutions.
The brief filed on behalf of Fisher does
focus on Texas policies-and specifically
their impact on Asian-American applicants.
Texas has stated that it considers black and
Latino students "under-represented" at the
university, based in part on their proportions
in the state population. And the Fisher brief
considers that illegal.
"UT's differing treatment of Asian
Americans and other minorities based on
each group's proportion of Texas's
population illustrates why demographic
balancing is constitutionally illegitimate ...
. UT gives no admissions preference to
Asian Americans even though 'the gross
number of Hispanic students attending UT
exceeds the gross number of AsianAmerican students attending UT. ' This
differing treatment of racial minorities based
solely on demographics provides clear
evidence that UT's conception of critical
mass is not tethered to the 'educational
benefits of a diverse student body.' UT has
not (and indeed cannot) offer any coherent
explanation for why fewer Asian Americans
than Hispanics are needed to achieve the
educational benefits of diversity."
A footnote in the brief seeks to drive home
the point: "Recognizing representational
diversity as a compelling state interest might
allow universities in racially homogenous
states to employ race to the detriment of
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qualified minority applicants in order to
maintain a student body that mirrors the
state population. Indeed, that is precisely the
problem facing Asian-American students in
Texas, as they are 'over-represented'
demographically but highly qualified
academically. "
University of Texas officials are not giving
interviews on the briefs. But an affidavit in
the case from Kedra Ishop, currently
director of admissions at UT -Austin and, at
the time she gave the statement, associate
director there, suggests that Texas may
contest the idea that Asian-American
applicants could not benefit from affirmative
action at the university.
In the statement, Ishop outlines factors that
could be considered in admissions, listing
them this way: "the socioeconomic status of
the applicant's family and school, whether
the applicant is from a single-parent home,
whether languages other than English are
spoken at the applicant's home, the
applicant's family responsibilities and
(starting with the fall class of 2005) the
applicant's race." These criteria suggest that
some Asian-American applicants could in
fact receive some assistance on the
university's approach to admissions.

brief, but opted not to do so. "We didn't
know enough then to take a clear stand, but
now we do," he said.
In the years since, he said, it has become
clear that consideration of race III
admissions is not solving the nation's
educational problems and "we now realize
how much we have been discriminated
against."
Four other Asian-American groups-the
Asian Pacific American Legal Center, the
Asian American Justice Center, Asian
American Institute and Asian Law Caucusfiled a joint brief backing the University of
Texas when the case was considered by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
And these groups are planning to file
another brief with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Woo said he realized that those groups had
been speaking for Asian Americans
generally in the affirmative action debate,
but he said that students and families don't
agree with them. He said he wasn't bothered
that other Asian-American groups would be
challenging his positions. "They will be, as
we will be, accountable. Let's see how it
will play out," he said.

Much of the reaction to the new brief
focused on the wisdom of Asian-American
groups taking a stand against the
consideration of race.

Several experts on Asian Americans in
higher education agreed with Woo that
many parents and families are frustrated by
the college admissions process, and perceive
it as hostile. But they questioned whether
affirmative action programs really are
responsible.

S.B. Woo, a retired professor of physics at
the University of Delaware, and president of
the 80-20 group, said he knew that
Tuesday's action was a significant step.
Nine years ago, when the U.S. Supreme
Court last considered the issue of race in
admissions, the group considered filing a

Mitchell 1. Chang, professor of higher
education, organizational change and AsianAmerican studies at the University of
California at Los Angeles, said that it is true
that many Asian Americans "seem to be the
ones who have the lowest chances, all things
being equal, of getting into the most
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selective institutions." Chang said that part
of the problems is the "hypercompetitive"
environment in selective college admissions.
But to the extent that Asian-American
applicants are being held to a higher
standard, Chang said, that is primarily
compared to white students, who aren't
benefiting from affirmative action. "There is
an issue we have to deal with: Why aren't
Asian
Americans
with
the
same
qualifications getting into the institutions at
the same rate as white students? That's the
question we have to address."
He said briefs like those filed Tuesday will
reinforce the sense that it is other minority
students taking slots from Asian Americans,
something Chang does not believe to be
true. "But that sentiment is out there, and
that's where [the brief filed Tuesday] is
going to have a real impact."
Robert Teranishi, associate professor of
higher education at New York University
and author of Asians in the Ivory Tower:
Dilemmas of Racial Inequality in American
Higher Education (Teachers College Press),
said he believed Tuesday's brief was based
on "a couple of false assumptions," one of
them being that programs for black and
Latino students should be a target. Teranishi
asked, for example, why those concerned
about the admission of Asian Americans to
colleges-especially
private
elite
institutions-were not focused more on
preferences for alumni children. While so
called "legacy admits" do include non-white
applicants,
such
preferences

overwhelmingly favor white people.
Teranishi also said he was worried by a
narrative that diversity effOlts help only
black and Latino students, and that
discussions of diversity should focus on elite
institutions. He said that many non-elite
institutions do quite a bit to recruit, admit
and graduate Asian-American students who
come from recent immigrant groups to the
United States and who typically do not fare
well in traditional admissions. Those
programs are vital, he said, but could
disappear if Texas loses at the Supreme
Court. "I fear we are seeing Asian
Americans used as a wedge group, which is
really problematic, based on narrow
interpretations of what affirmative action
is. "
Fmther, he said that he worries that the
current focus will distract Asian-American
leaders from emerging threats in higher
education. For instance, he said that he
worried that the current emphasis of many
colleges to recruit many more international
undergraduates (many of whom are from
Asia) was creating a false sense that higher
education has "too many Asians." While
Teranishi said he was in no way opposed to
international recruitment, he said he wanted
to know how this emphasis on foreign
students (who can pay their own way) was
affecting other diversity efforts.
Over all, he said, Asian Americans benefit
not from attacking affirmative action, but
from "broader inclusion."
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"U. of Texas Aims at Supreme Court's Likely Swing Vote in
Defending Race-Conscious Admissions"
The Chronicle of Higher Ed1lcation
August 7, 2012
Peter Schmidt
The University of Texas at Austin is
defending race-conscious admissions before
the U.S. Supreme Court with arguments that
explicitly seek to win over Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, widely regarded as the court's
swing vote on the issue.
In a brief submitted to the court on Monday,
the university focuses much of its energy on
offering Justice Kennedy assurances that the
policy is distinct from one he found
troublesome when the Supreme Court last
weighed in on such admission practices, in
2003.
More broadly, the university argues that its
policy exemplifies the type that the Supreme
Court approved in its previous decisions on
affirmative action, and accuses those
challenging its admission policy as
unconstitutional of seeking to overturn 35
years' worth of Supreme Court precedents
dealing with colleges' consideration of the
race or ethnicity of applicants.
The brief argues that Abigail Noel Fisher,
the rejected Texas applicant who filed the
lawsuit now before the court, "really is just
asking this court to move the goal posts on
higher education in America." It argues that
a Supreme Com1 decision to overrule, or
effectively gut, past court decisions allowing
race-conscious
admissions
"would
jeopardize the nation's paramount interest in
educating its future leaders in an
environment that best prepares them for the
society and work force they will encounter."

In a videotaped announcement that the brief
had been filed, William C. Powers Jr., the
flagship campus's president, said, "We're
confident that we'll prevail in this case, and
that this will bring benefit to American
higher education and to our nation and to the
State of Texas."
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
arguments in the case, Fisher v. University
of Texas at Allstin (No. 11-345), in October.
One its more liberal members, Justice Elena
Kagan, has recused herself, having been
involved in her previous position as U.S.
solicitor
general
in
the
Obama
administration's submission of a brief
supporting Texas when the case was before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
Of the court's eight remammg members,
four-Chief Justice John G. Robel1s Jr. and
Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Antonin Scalia,
and Clarence Thomas-are regarded as so
skeptical of race-conscious government
policies they probably will seek to abandon
the court's 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger
decision, which declared that narrowly
tailored race-conscious admission policies
can serve a compelling government interest.
Three others, Justices Stephen G. Breyer,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor,
are seen as likely to fully suppol1 Texas.
Justice Kennedy stands out as a swing vote
because in the Grutter decision he accepted
the idea that such policies provide
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educational benefits that serve a government
interest, but rejected the policy at issue,
from the University of Michigan's law
school.
In the separate dissent he penned as part of
the court's 5-4 Grutter ruling, Justice
Kennedy argued that the Michigan law
school gave too much weight to race for its
policy to be considered narrowly tailored.
He accused the law school of using race as
"an automatic factor" in most admission
decisions. Citing evidence that the law
school's admissions officers consulted daily
repOlis
breaking
down
the
racial
composition of each incoming class, he
argued that the school was using "numerical
goals indistinguishable from quotas," which
the Supreme Court had struck down in 1978
ruling in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, involving a medical
school.
The brief that the University of Texas filed
on Monday said its policy "lacks the
features that Justice Kennedy found
disqualifying in Gmtter: It is undisputed that
UT has not established any race-based
target; race is not assigned any automatic
value; and the racial or ethnic composition
of admits is not monitored during the
admissions cycle."
Texas's brief accuses Ms. Fisher's lawyers,
who submitted their own brief to the court in
May, of going back on factual concessions
they had previously made in the case by
freshly accusing Texas of trying to strike a
particular racial balance in its enrollment.
The university says that it considered the

state's demographic breakdown only in
considering whether black or Hispanic
students were underrepresented on the
Austin campus, and that the way its
admission process is structured precludes
any attempt to pass decisions on applications
with race- or ethnicity-based enrollment
targets in mind.
In response to arguments by Ms. Fisher's
lawyers that the court should consider
overturning Grutter, the university argues
that a court decision to change its stand after
just nine years "would upset legitimate
expectations in the rule of law," not to
mention society'S interest in training
America's future leaders in a diverse
campus environment. The university accuses
Ms. Fisher's lawyers of improperly raising
an issue that had not been before the lower
courts and was beyond the scope of its
request that the Supreme COUli hear the
case.
Much of the university's brief is devoted to
countering the other side's argument that the
university had been achieving sufficient
levels of diversity through a race-neutral
means, a state law guaranteeing admission
to any public university to young Texans in
the top tenth of their high-school class.
Such an argument, it says, "ignores the
importance of diversity among individuals
within racial groups" and the educational
of
considering
individual
benefits
applicants' race to ensure that, for example,
it can enroll minority students from
relatively advantaged backgrounds who can
help break down stereotypes.
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